van Els, Paul. "Een niet-bestaande leer" (A Non-Existent Doctrine). Review of Confucianisme, by Burchard J. Mansvelt Beck. China Nu 31, no. 1 (2006): 46–47.

How can one distinguish the concept of second modernity from the concept of postmodernity? Postmodernists are interested in deconstruction without reconstruction, second modernity is about deconstruction and reconstruction. Social sciences need to construct new concepts to understand the world dynamics at the beginning of the 21st century. Modernity has not vanished, we are not post it. Radical social change has always been part of modernity. What is new is that modernity has begun to modernize its own foundations. This is what (...) it means to say modernity has become reflexive. It has become directed at itself. This causes huge new problems both in reality and in theory. There has been a pluralization of the boundaries within and between societies, between society and nature, between Us and Other, between life and death. This pluralization also changes the inherent nature of boundaries. They become not so much boundaries as a variety of attempts to draw of boundaries. Border conflicts become transformed into conflicts over the drawing of boundaries. Where postmodernism simply celebrates this multiplication of boundaries, the theory of second modernity starts with the problem this new reality poses for individual and collective decisions, and with the problem that the continued existence of such decisions poses for theory. Institutions that are capable of such conscious boundary drawing are enabled in a way that those of the first modernity were not. But this process also generates qualitatively new kinds of trouble and crises. To investigate those troubles is to unveil the emergence of the second modernity. (shrink)

‘Transplant’ thought-experiments, in which the cerebrum is moved from one body to another, have featured in a number of recent discussions in the personal identity literature. Once taken as offering confirmation of some form of psychological continuity theory of identity, arguments from Marya Schechtman and Kathleen Wilkes have contended that this is not the case. Any such apparent support is due to a lack of detail in their description or a reliance on predictions that we are in no position to (...) make. I argue that the case against them rests on two serious misunderstandings of the operation of thought-experiments, and that even if they do not ultimately support a psychological continuity theory, they do major damage to that theory’s opponents. (shrink)

This article differentiates between three different axes of conflict in world risk society. The first axis is that of ecological conflicts, which are by their very essence global. The second is global financial crises, which, in a first stage, can be individualized and nationalized. And the third, which suddenly broke upon us on September 11th, is the threat of transnational terror networks, which empowers governments and states. Two sets of implications are drawn: first, there are the political dynamics of world (...) risk society. In an age where trust and faith in God, class and progress have largely disappeared, humanity's common fear has proved the last - ambivalent - resource for making new bonds. Second, the methodological nationalism that preoccupies the sociological imagination has to be overcome and a `methodological cosmopolitism' has to be created. (shrink)

In this article I want to outline an argument for a New Critical Theory with a cosmopolitan intent. Its main purpose is to undermine one of the most powerful beliefs of our time concerning society and politics. This belief is the notion that “modern society” and “modern politics” are to be understood as society and politics organized around the nation‐state, equating society with the national imagination of society. There are two aspects to this body of beliefs: what I call the (...) “national perspective” of social actors, and the “methodological nationalism” of scientific observers. The distinction between these two perspectives is important because there is no logical co‐implication between them, only an interconnected genesis and history. (shrink)

Philosophers have traditionally used thought-experiments in their endeavours to find a satisfactory account of the self and personal identity. Yet there are considerations from empirical psychology as well as related ones from philosophy itself that appear to completely undermine the method of thought-experiment. This paper focuses on both sets of considerations and attempts a defence of the method.

This article differentiates between three different axes of conflict in world risk society. The first axis is that of ecological conflicts, which are by their very essence global. The second is global financial crises, which, in a first stage, can be individualized and nationalized. And the third, which suddenly broke upon us on September 11th, is the threat of transnational terror networks, which empowers governments and states. Two sets of implications are drawn: first, there are the political dynamics of world (...) risk society. In an age where trust and faith in God, class and progress have largely disappeared, humanity's common fear has proved the last - ambivalent - resource for making new bonds. Second, the methodological nationalism that preoccupies the sociological imagination has to be overcome and a `methodological cosmopolitism' has to be created. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Activists and writers on injustice have highlighted as a structural problem that injustice is experienced differentially. What injustices of privilege lie hidden in my daily academic life? Three deeply discomforting moments relating to Class, climate, and Whiteness privilege, form the core of an account of gradually admitting to my passive acceptance of injustice in the form of privileges from which I benefit. My ignorance has perpetuated privilege despite this not being my conscious will. From this crisis, the paper explores (...) the inner work for healing injustice individually, and the outer work of changing collective habits of dominance within the Academy. A starting point is befriending my will to injustice and facing up to my privileges. Effort needed from White, Middle Class academics ‘like me’ includes uncovering ways in which we benefit from privilege whether or not we want to. Proposals are made for inner growth through building community among academics. (shrink)

Marya Schechtman's The Constitution of Selves presented an impressive attempt to persuade those working on personal identity to give up mainstream positions and take on a narrative view instead. More recently, she has presented new arguments with a closely related aim. She attempts to convince us to give up the view of identity as a matter of psychological continuity, using Derek Parfit's story of the “Nineteenth Century Russian” as a central example in making the case against Parfit's own view, and (...) offers a form of narrative theory as a way out of the problem. In this paper I consider this new case, and argue that we should not be persuaded towards the narrative. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to argue that the recent philosophical defenses of revealed preference theory do not withstand scrutiny. Towards this aim, I will first outline revealed preference theory. I will then briefly present the two most common arguments that the received view offers against it. Afterwards, I will outline three argumentative strategies for rehabilitating revealed preference theory, and successively rebut each of them.

Derek Parfit argues in Reasons and Persons that acting according to your present desires is more rational, or at least as rational, as acting in your long-term self-interest. To do this, he puts forward a case supporting a 'critical present-aim theory' of rationality opposed to the self-interest theory, and then argues against a number of possible replies. This article is a response to these arguments, concluding that Parfit's favouring of the present-aim theory is unfounded, and that self-interest is the better (...) theory of rationality. (shrink)

Marya Schechtman and Grant Gillett acknowledge that my case in ‘The misunderstandings of the Self-Understanding View’ (2013) has some merits, but neither is moved to change their position and accept that the Psychological View has more going for it (and the Self-Understanding View less) than Schechtman originally contended. Schechtman thinks her case could be better expressed, and then the deficiencies of the Psychological View will be manifest. That view is committed to Locke’s insight about the importance of phenomenological connections to (...) identity, but cannot do justice to this insight and as a result fails to explain things that it should. I will argue that my case still applies, re-expression notwithstanding .. (shrink)

(2005). Heidegger and Relativity Theory. Angelaki: Vol. 10, continental philosophy and the sciences the german traditionissue editor: damian veal, pp. 163-179.

Thought-experiments in which one person divides into two have been important in the literature on personal identity. I consider three influential arguments which aim to undermine the force of these thought-experiments – arguments from David Wiggins, Patricia Kitcher and Kathleen Wilkes. I argue that all three fail, leaving us to face the consequences of splitting, whatever those may be.

Hume distinguished the principle that everything has a cause from the principle of the uniformity of nature, Viz., That like causes have like effects. In the second analogy of experience kant attempts to refute what he (erroneously) believed had been hume's explanation of our acceptance of the first principle. He did not there attempt to establish the second principle, But j dodge has shown that the second analogy implicitly contains a justification of the principle of like cause-Like effect. Kant himself, (...) However, Justified the second principle only as a regulative principle of reflective judgment. (shrink)

If school attendance is important for social integration, then a particular out of school practice like home education could possibly represent a threat to social integration. The findings of a Norwegian research project that surveyed socialization among Norwegian home educated students from different regions are presented and discussed using socialization theory and a theory of cultural order. Among the conclusions are the following: Pragmatically motivated home educated students are often socially well integrated. Religiously motivated home educated students that hold values (...) distant from the values of society are not necessarily socially isolated. With more openness and more communication between society and home educators home educated students could meet criteria for social integration even more so than is presently the case. (shrink)

International Rules brings together exemplary works from the most prominent approaches to international rules of International Law and International Relations disciplines. Included are chapters on Natural Law, Legal Positivism, Classical Realism, the New Haven School, Institutionalism, Structural Realism, the New Stream, and Feminist Voices. Each of the eight chapters begins with a brief overview, offers a representative work or works, and concludes with a selected bibliography. From Hugo Grotius to David Kennedy, from George Kennan to Robert Keohane, the featured authors (...) provide valuable insights into their common subject: international rules. Despite divergent methods and objectives, they address fundamentally the same questions: What is the nature of such rules? What is their purpose? How do they originate? What role, if any, do they play in politics? Framing the selections assembled are two original chapter-length essays. The first chapter of this volume assesses the prospects for interdisciplinary collaboration; the final one suggests a direction for future research. (shrink)

“With great power comes great responsibility.” In today’s world, with our growing technological power and the knowledge about its impact, we are considered to be responsible for many instances that not long ago would have been deemed a matter of fate. At the same time, the looming options of, e.g., genome editing or neuroprosthetics, threaten traditional notions of responsibility if no longer the person but the technology involved is deemed to be responsible for a specific behaviour. The growing ethical debate (...) on the expansion of human responsibility, e.g. when it comes to human-machine-interaction, ambient intelligence, or reproductive technologies, thus intertwines with the challenge to formulate an appropriate understanding of the concept of personal responsibility and our respective anthropological self-understanding in today’s technological world. The volume brings together both perspectives and aims at illuminating crucial dimensions of responsibility in light of technological innovation and our self-understanding as responsible beings. (shrink)

The purpose of this brief paper is to show that the primary problem of technology, like all problems related to possibilities and actions, is the conceptual adequacy of the intentions and values it implies, and not, as many critics have suggested, its social effects. Presupposed for this statement and evaluation is an interpretation of experience called here experiential idealism. On the basis of this position some suggestions are made about the meaning of technology and its correlative possibilities and constraints.

The purpose of this brief paper is to show that the primary problem of technology, like all problems related to possibilities and actions, is the conceptualiadequacyof the intentions and values it implies, and not, as many critics have suggested, its social effects. Presupposed for this statement and evaluation is an interpretation of experience called here experiential idealism. On the basis of this position some suggestions are made about the meaning of technology and its correlative possibilities and constraints.